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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1981 the Contracts and Conunercial Law Reform Cornmittee
1 
proposed a reform 
of the doctrine of privity of contract. That doctrine establishes "that only 
parties to a contract can sue or be sued upon the contract; that a stranger 
to the contract can have neither rights, nor obligations conferred or imposed 
by the contract.
2 
It has, since the case of Tweddle v. Atkinson
3 in 1861, 
which firmly established it, been regarded as one of the fundamental 
cornerstones of contract law. 
The reform proposed by the committee is in response to the large amount of 
. . . 4 
criticism that has been levelled at the doctrine. This has principally 
centred around the manifest injustice of preventing a third party from suing 
on a contract, defeating what is very often the express intention of the 
contracting parties themselves. 
But it is also due to the great uncertainty that has resulted from the variety 
of means, occasionally fictitious, that have been employed by the judiciary 
to overcome the rigour of the doctrine. As long ago as 1939 it was noted 
"the law relating to what may shortly be called third party contracts is 
today, and in fact, has been during the whole course of our legal development 
uncertain and unsatisfactory. Alternate ly comforted and disowned by the 
courts the beneficiary of a contract made between others can point to a long, 
unhappy history, half within and half without the protection of the law. 
Today, in certain special circumstances he can claim a limited amount of 
statutory recognition, but beyond those limits his position seems to be a 
matter of individual opinion, and good authority can be found for practically 
any view. 11 5 
To rectify this situation the Conunittee proposed "the enactment of legislation 
to enable a third party to enforce a term of contract intended by the 
contracting parties to benefit him, or to give to him the benefit of any 
immunity or limitation of liability, which the contracting parties intended 
to apply to him, in cases where it appears, as a matter of construction of 
the contract, that the contracting parties also intended that the beneficiary 
6 
would have rights of enforcement of that term." This recommendation is 
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2 
enacted in section 4 of the Contracts (Privity) Bill. 
This paper, in light of the concern expressed as to the need for certainty in 
the area of privity, seeks to consider the effectiveness of section 4 in 
providing for, and yet regulating, the third parties' rights in contract law. 
For just as important as giving effect to the rights of third parties, when 
expressed in the contract, is the need to protect the rights of the 
contracting parties themselves. A contract is still essentially "a personal 
. 7 
affair" and although it is necessary to give third parties the right to sue on 
a contract to give effect to the intentions of the contracting parties, that 
right should not be allowed to have the effect of overwhelming and defeating 
the contracting parties in situations where such was not contemplated. 
3 
II. SECTION 4(2): THE INTENTION TO DENY ENFORCEABILITY 
As has been noted the recommendations of the Contracts and Commercial Law 
Reform Committee have been substantially enacted by section 4 of the Bill. 
The latter part of the Bill serves, basically, to regulate the rights 
conferred by that section .
8 
Section 4, however, differs substantiallyfrom that recommendation in its 
wording. 
Section 4 states: 
(1) Where a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, or 
purports to confer, a benefit on a person who is not a party to the 
deed or contract (whether or not the person is identified or in 
existence at the time when the deed or contract is made) the 
promissor shall be under an obligation, enforceable at the suit of 
that person to perform that promise. 
(2) This section does not apply to a promise which, on the proper 
construction of the deed or contract, is not intended to create 
an obligation enforceable at the suit of that person. 
In order to consider the scope of section 4, and hence its effect on the 
contracting parties it is necessary to ascertain what limits are to be 
placed on the third parties ' rights of enforcement. The most obvious 
limitation is that contained in subsection 2. 
Subsection 2 provides that where a promise is not intended to be 
enforceable by a third party, section 4 shall not apply. 
h . 9 h Te onus is put on the pronussor tote contract. The subsection 
anticipates a situation where the two contracting parties expressly provide 
that some third party, who is intended to benefit from the performance of the 
contract, shall have no legally enforceable rights. This provision is made 
because, logically, where a third party is provided for in a contract there 
will prime facie be a right in him to enforce the contract. That right can 
only be removed by the terms of the contract itself. 
• •• 4 
4 
. 10 
Corbin correctly notes that "In the making of contracts, parties do not 
often consciously advert to the legal r elations that will be created by their 
expressions . They attempt to make no analysis of those relations, even if they 
are competent to do so. The existence of legal relations is not dependent 
upon an intent to create them. If one party makes a promise to another who 
gives a sufficient consideration in return, these facts will create a right and 
a duty even though the parties are quite unaware of the law or of what a 
"consideration " is. There is no more r eason for an intent to create a "right" 
in a third party than for r equiring an intent to create one in a direct 
promisee .... On the other hand, the contracting parties have power to control 
their legal relations with each other in great measure if they care to do so 
and consciously advert to them .... Therefore, if two contracting parties 
expressly provide that some third party who will be benefitted by 
pexformance shall have no legally enforceable right, the courts should 
11 
eff ectuate the expressed intent by denying the third party any direct remedy." 
It is apparent, therefore, that where a contract specifies, as one of its 
terms, that a promise will create no rights in the third party then that 
party cannot seek to enforce it. 
However, it is unlikely that it was intended that the contracting parties 
should have to specifically deny the rights of third parties in all cases. 
In some instances the wording of the contract may indicate that a promise is 
not intended to be enforceable without actually addressing itself to that 
problem. 
12 
The American case of Sachs v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co. illustrates 
how one term in a contract may colour another term which appears to confer 
enforcement rights. The defendant was a reinsurer who took over certain 
assets of another insurance company and promised the latter company "to 
assume and discharge all of the contracts and liabilities of the Insurer." 
This would appear to apply to all creditors of the insurance company. 
However, another term in the contract provided that "the Reinsurer, after 
the transfer of the said policies to it, shall be directly liable at the 
suit of and to any policy holder upon such policy." It is clear that 
the Reinsurer assumed the obligation of the Insurer to its policy holders 
and that they had rights of enforcement. 
• •• 5 
5 
But the Insurer had other obligations and creditors. It held certain shares 
in a bank on which, because of the bank's subsequent insolvency, it became 
under a statutory liability to the bank's creditors. The court held that the 
Reinsurer did not promise to discharge this liability and that the bank's 
creditors were not third party beneficiaries. 
Although the words were "all of the contracts and liabilities of the 
Insurer" the circumstances and language of the contract indicated that the 
promise was r e stricted to the Insurer's liabilities to policy holders on the 
policies transferred. It is submitted that a similar conclusion would be 
unavoidable under section 4. 
Th
. b d . . . h 13 is case may e contraste with another American case, Ridder v. Blet en . 
A complex contract between Colonel Blethen and Ridder for the organisation of 
a corporation to publish the Seattle Times, then controlled by 
Colonel Blethen, contained a provision that Blethen should make a will or 
trust instrument providing that "Blethen's class B common stock shall be 
distributed by the trustees among the surviving sons of the said Blethen in 
equal shares . Afterwards Blethen disinherited one of his sons and the 
latter sued to enforce an asserted right as beneficiary of the provision in the 
contract with Ridder. Parol testimony as to the full history of the 
transaction including negotiations and conversations between Ridder and Blethen 
convinced the court that the quoted provision was solely for the purposes of 
ensuring continued control of the Times by Blethen's family, not for the 
benefit of Blethen's sons. The court held that the provision did not create 
an enforceable right in the son as beneficiary. 
The focus of this question, under section 4(2), is the phrase "on the proper 
construction of the deed or contract" in the subsection. It would appear that 
under section 4 a different conclusion would be reached than that which was 
reached by the American courts . For on the face of the contract the son did 
have an enforceable right and any parol evidence to the contrary would 
appear to be beyond the consideration of the court. 
This result is to be recommended, for despite its apparent harshness to the 
contracting party in this case, it is submitted that it would be of much 
•.• 6 
6 
greater injustice to deny the third party his right of recovery after the 
admittance of parol evidence , evidence of which he himself may have been 
unaware. The result is necessary to provide the certainty that has been 
lacking up to date in this area of law. 
So far we have discussed the fact that a specific clause may indicate an 
intention not to confer enforc ement rights, and the fact that parol evidence 
may not negate this intention. But what if the contract itself impliedly 
suggests that the obligation should not be enforceable by a third party. Can 
such an implication be said to be derived from "the proper construction of 
the deed or contract "? 
14 
In Gandy v. Gandy a husband who was separated from his wife entered into a 
separation agreement by which he promised trustees to pay them an annuity for 
the benefit of his wife and to pay them money for the maintenance and 
education of his daughters. In his judgment Cotton LJ stated
15 
"I think we 
have to consider this - whether the two trustees who are defendants, did 
enter into the contract so as to give to these children a beneficial right to 
the consequences of the covenant being performed. In my opinion that was not 
so. This was a separation deed. The two parties who had to be provided for 
were the husband and wife ... in my opinion, this covenant, as regards the 
children was not to give them any benefit by way of right - any beneficial 
right - but simply to provide as to what was to be done by the husband on this 
separation and on this contract between himself and his wife." 
In this case Cotton LJ was concerned with whether a trust could be found in 
favour of the children. The intention required, it is submitted, is more 
stringent than would be the case under section 4 and it is not suggested that 
were a similar case to arise under section 4 the result would be the same. 
But consider the reasoning in this case. Cotton LJ found that a contract, 
which on the face of it purported to grant a benefit in favour of third 
parties, and hence enforcement rights, was , in fact, not intended for this 
purpose. It was a contract regulating the actions of one of the parties and 
was not intended to be enforceable by the third parties, the children . That 
such reasoning is possible under an enactment such as section 4 is sustained 
••. 7 
7 
16 
by the almost parallel American case of Percival v. Luce where the 
defendant had contracted to pay $25 per month to the mother of a child for 
the child's support. The court held that the child was a mere incidental 
beneficiary and could not maintain suit. 
Both cases can be criticised in that they seem to ignore what appears to be 
one of the predominant intentionsof the contract, that is, to benefit the 
children. And, as in Ridder v. Blethen above, by far the better course would 
be to give effect to the intention as expressed on the face of the contract 
itself. 
Should the courts be able to justify such reasoning as that found in 
Gandy v. Gandy under section 4 then this will create in the courts a much 
wider discretion than is at first apparent. Such a discretion could lead to 
a considerable amount of uncertainty, as often a finding in favour of one 
party over another will be a subjective decision on the part of the judge him-
self. However, this discretion would still need to be aligned to the 
contract itself and may not create a great amount of difficulty. 
Finally, two other situations must be considered which indicate even further 
the limitation created by subsection 2. The first is illustrated by 
Re Sinclair's Life Policy
17 
where a policy of life insurance taken out by the 
assured for the benefit of his godson contained an option enabling the 
assured to surrender the policy for his own benefit. 
18 
The second is found in the case of Re Schebsman Schebsman was employed by 
two companies. By a contract made between him and them, one of the 
companies agreed in certain eventualities to pay iS , 500 to his widow and 
daughter. It was held that the contract did not create a trust in favour 
of the widow and daughter. Du Parcg W stated "It is true that, by the use 
possibly of unguarded language, a person may create a trust ... without 
knowing it but unless an intention to create a trust is clearly to be 
collected from the language used and the circumstances of the case, I think 
that the court ought not to be astute to discover indications of such an 
intention. I have little doubt that in the present case both parties (and 
certainly the debtor) intended to keep alive their common law right to vary 
•.. 8 
8 
consensually the terms of the obligation undertaken by the company and if 
circumstances had changed in the debtor's lifetime injustice might have been 
done by holding that a trust has been created and that those terms were 
d
. 19 
accor ingly unalterable." 
In both cases the contracting parties seek to benefit the third parties 
while retaining for themselves the right to vary the promise and hence 
removing from the third party the right to enforce the promise. However, 
section 5 of the Contracts (Privity) Bill states that a promise may not be 
varied, except with the consent of the third party, where "the position of a 
beneficiary has been materially altered by the reliance of that beneficiary " 
or where judgment has been obtained. Section 6 of the Bill provides that a 
promise may be varied by agreement between all the parties, including the 
third party, or if "the deed or contract contained,when the promise was made, 
an expr ess provision to that effect; 
beneficiary." 
and the provision is known to the 
The question to be considered is whether the promissor 's desire to retain his 
right to vary the contract would in fact negative an intention to allow the 
third party to enforce the contract. In the case of Re Sinclair's Life Policy 
the provision was contained in the contract and if the godson knew of the 
provision it is apparent that he could not enforce it. In Re Schebsman on 
the other hand the third parties would have enforcement rights as no 
provision for variation exists in the contract itself. 
These cases, it is submitted, indicate the effect of subsection 2 , in the 
context of the section. The subsection serves as a limitation on the 
contracting parties ' ability to deny the third party enforcement rights. By 
putting the onus on the contracting parties to show that the promise was not 
intended to be enforceable and by requiring that this be done by considering 
only the terms of the contract itself it is apparent that the only means of 
limiting the third parties' right of enforcement is by refusing those rights 
in the contract itself. 
9 
III. MISLAID INTENTION? 
If the effect of subsection 2 is to limit the contracting parties, in order to 
protect the rights of the third party beneficiary, the next consideration must 
be what limitations are placed on the third parties' right of recovery. Do 
any limitations need to be placed on their rights at all? 
That limitations do indeed need to be placed on the rights of the third party 
beneficiary, under section 4, may be illustrated. First, in a hypothetical 
situation , a railway company contracts with A, a manufacturer in town M, to 
extend its line to M, which would enhance the value of land held by X, a large 
property owner in that district. If, for any reason, the deal falls through, 
X might wish to enforce the contract. It should appear that X would have no 
right of action. In Spurrier v. Burnett
20 
the defendant promised to give 
land to the state for highway purposes; and the state contracted to pay the 
plaintiff 's a large sum for constructing the highway. The performance promised 
by the defendant would not itself have benefitted the plaintiff, although 
without it he could not build the road and make a profit. It did not appear 
that this benefit to the plaintiff was contemplated by the defendant or by the 
state in contracting for the land. The plaintiff was held to have no 
enforceable right. 
In the two situations just cited a third party is seeking to claim on a 
contract in which it is unlikely that he was even contemplated as a beneficiary. 
Obviously they should have no rights of enforcement. 
. . . . . ., 21 d b Yet it is difficult to see how these "incidental beneficiaries coul e 
prevented from recovering under section 4. In each case there is a promise 
contained in the contract which would confer a benefit on the third party. 
Yet in these instances neither party to the contract even had the third party 
in contemplation. Why then should they advert to the possibility of the 
third party seeking recovery by denying that party the right to recover? 
Obviously, they will not have and there would appear to be no barrier to the 
variety and number of third parties who could seek enforcement of a 
contract which, even indirectly, benefits them. A further limitation is 
required. 
. .. 10 
10 
One has to go only as far as the report of the Contracts and Commercial Law 
Reform Committee to discover what that limitation might be. Their proposal, 
as noted earlier, "is the enactment of legislation to enable a third party to 
enforce a term of a contract intended by the contracting parties to benefit 
him ... in cases where it appears as a matter of construction of the contract, 
that the contracting parties also intended that the beneficiary would have 
rights of enforcement of that term. 
An intention to benefit would serve as a limitation in the cases above. 
Obviously, the third parties in those cases were not intended to be benefitted, 
and hence a right of enforcement could not be said to exist. 
11 
IV. THE INTENTION TO BENEFIT 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee obviously considered the 
need for an intention to benefit as an important aspect of their proposal. 
Ho~ever, it is not readily apparent in the section that such a provision 
exists. It is, therefore, important to ascertain in what way, if any, this 
limitation has been incorporated into section 4. 
A. The Promise 
Subsection 1 of the section provides that there must be a "promise" 
contained in the deed or contract. The promise referred to, in this 
instance, may merely be the promise to perform a service, which may be 
beneficial to a third party though uncontemplated by the parties to the 
contract. 
Yet, on the other hand, the most obvious indication of a lack of 
intention to benefit is evidenced by the absence of any promise to render 
the beneficial performance that the plaintiff desires. Such a situation 
would exist where there is a promise in a contract, yet it is not a 
promise to benefit the third party. 
22 
Thus in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Teter it was found that a 
contract by A promising to indemnify B against loss on an investment is 
not a contract for the benefit of B's creditors on which they can sue A, 
even though the indemnity was executed on the demand of those creditors. 
The performance promised by A is not one that will perform B's duty to 
his creditors; it merely strengthens B's capacity to perform his own 
duty. The basis for such reasoning is that it is possible for the 
contract to be fully performed without ever benefitting the third party, 
this it is unjust to allow a claim by the third party against the 
promissor of the contract. 
It is submitted that the logic of such an argument cannot be disputed. 
The effect of such a construction would be to require that the contract 
provide for the third party. For in order that the third party may have 
enforcement rights he would first have to show that the promise was 
... 12 
12 
expressed to be for his benefit. 
However, such a construction is by no means certain. The Committee 
themselves express reservations as to a requirement that the contract must 
23 
provide expressly for the third party. Indeed such a restriction would 
have quite wide effects . Among the contracts that would be unenforceable 
by a third party would be a promise to pay money to a debtor 
for him to use in paying his debts and similarly a promise by an insurance 
company to indemnify A against claims would not be a promise to pay the 
1 
. 24 
c a1mants. 
The word "promise " in subsection 1 may be interpreted as requiring the 
necessary intention to benefit, only if the specific construction con-
templated is adopted. 
will remain unlimited. 
If not, then the third parties right of recovery 
B. "Confers or Purports to Confer" 
Under subsection 1 the only other phrase which would appear to convey 
this intention is the phrase "confers, or purports to confer." 
"Purports " is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning to 
profess or claim by its tenor; to mean, intend, or purpose." 
This cannot be sufficient to establish, in section 4, the need for an 
intention to benefit. In the phrase, "confers " is the principal 
defining word. As such it is necessarily broader than "purports to 
confer" if this is taken to mean intended to confer. It is quite 
possible to confer something without actually intending to do so. 
A second, and more appropriate, construction of the phrase would be to 
take "p urports " as being synonymous with "claim by its tenor" or 
imply. This would suggest that "confers " covers benefits expressed on 
the face of the contract while "purports to confer " would mean a 
benefit, that although not expressly provided for in the contract, is 
impliedly suggested. 
. .. 13 
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A problem of quite substantial proportions is thrown up by the 
suggestion that section 4 should include implied terms in favour of 
third parties, for this infers that the above construction that, for there 
to be a promise, it must be expressed as being for the benefit of the 
third party on the face of the contract, is unjustified. 
The suggestion itself is given further support by noting the 
Committee's criticism of the Western Australian provision relating to 
third party rights. They state" ... the word ' expressly ' ... would 
indicate that implied terms in favour of the third parties are 
25 
excluded." Added weight is also given by the considerable difference 
in structure between the New Zealand Bill and s 11(2) of the Property 
Law Act 1969 (Western Australia) which essentially restates the 
, , , , , 26 , . II 
recommendation of the UK Law Revision Committee in 1937 in stating that where 
a contract e xp r e ssly in its terms purports to confer a benefit 
directly on a person who is not named as a party to the contract, the 
contract is, subject to subsection 3 of this section, enforceable by 
that person in his own name ... " 
However, still left unresolved is the question of precisely what is 
meant by an "implied term". Various constructions may be considered. 
For many years attempts have been made to use exemption clauses as a 
means of conferring immunity on servants and many cases deal with this 
area of law, especially in regard to shipping. Under section 4 it would 
appear that a servant would be able to claim the benefit of exemption 
clauses such as this: " every exemption , limitation, condition and 
liberty herein contained and every right, exemption from liability, 
defence and immunity ... applicable to the Carrie r or to which the 
Carrie r is entitled hereunder shall also be available and shall extend 
, II 27 
to protect every ... servant or agent of the carrier .... 
But the situation is much more difficult where the servant is not 
expressly provided for by the contract but may be so by implication, and 
often there will be much dispute as to whether or not it should be so 
implied. In Adler v. Dickson
28 
a sailing ticket issued to the plaintiff by 
... 14 
14 
a shipping company for a Mediterranean cruise contained, inter alia, the 
following conditions. "Passengers ... are carried at passenger 's 
entire risk" and "the company shall not be responsible for and shall be 
exempt from all liability in respect of any ... injury whatsoever of or 
to the person of any passenger ... whether the same shall arise from or 
be occasioned by the negligence of the company's servants ... in the 
discharge of their duties, or whether by the negligence of other person's 
directly or indirectly in the employment or service of the company ... 
under any circumstances whatsoever." It should be noted that neither 
provision seeks to expressly exempt the servants from liability. The 
plaintiff was injured when mounting the gangway of the ship at a port of 
call and brought an action in negligence against the master and 
boatswain of the ship. 
In the case Denning LJ reasoned
29 
"The truth is that there was only one 
contract, namely the contract evidenced by the bill of lading: and the 
reason why the stevedores and others are protected is because, although 
they were not parties to the contract nevertheless they participated in 
the performance of it, and although the exception clause was not made 
expressly for their benefit, it is tvue, but nevertheless it was by 
necessary implications, which is just as good; and they have a sufficient 
interest to entitle them to enforce it. Their interest lies in this; 
they participated in so far as it affected them and can take those 
benefits of it which apportion to their interest therein." It is 
apparent that Denning LJ felt that although the benefit was not conferred 
by the contract expressly it should be done so by implication. 
However, other members of the court felt differently. The majority of the 
Court held that the contract neither expressly nor by necessary implication 
deprived the plaintiff of her right to sue the defendant's in tort. To 
30 
this end Jenkins LJ stated "I take it to be the law that a defendant 
sued in tort who claims that the plaintiff has by some contract with the 
defendant deprived himself,in advance, of his right of action in respect 
of the wrong done him must show that the contract relied on does expressly 
or by necessary implications clearly deprive the plaintiff of such right. 
The contract here relied on, to my mind, falls far short of this test so 
... 15 
15 
far as the plaintiff 's right of action against the defendent is concerned." 
Such variance of reasoning could be applied to an entire class of cases 
under third party law. It would appear that it was with these that the 
UK Law Revision Committee of 1937 were concerned when it was stated 
31 
"But just as the statutory assignment of contractual rights is subject 
to certain limitations, so the statutory recognition of third party 
rights ought to be carefully limited. The first and most important 
provision ought to be that no third party right can be acquire unless 
given by the express terms of the contract. A third party right ought 
not to be acquired by implication, e .g., merely because the performance 
of the contract will benefit the third party. " 
Similarly in the United States the so called "incidental beneficiary" is 
refused the right to enforce the contract. "It is not every promise made 
by one to another, from the performance of which a benefit may ensue 
to a third, which gives a right of action to such third persons , he being 
neither party to the contract nor to the considerations. The contract 
must be made for his benefit as its object, and he must be the party 
intended to be benefitted.
1132 
Even if this express opposition to the suggestion that implied terms be 
enforceable is rejected major difficulties would be created by allowing 
such a construction. As is evidenced by the reasoning in Adler v. 
Dickson in any instance a great diversity of judicial opinion may be 
found as regards the merits of a particular case. Often the justification 
for implying a term will be a matter of subjective opinion, returning this 
area of law to the unc e rtainty which prevails at p r esent under the 
common law. 
Added to this difficulty is the question of the intention of the 
contracting parties . The justification for implying a term into a 
contract must be that there was an intention that the third party be 
benefitted. Where the term is not expressed on the face of the contract 
how is that intention to be ascertained? Would parol evidence be 
admissible? Does the intention have to be expressed by both parties to 
... 16 
16 
the contract, or is it sufficient if only one party expresses it?
33 
In the end it would appear that the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform 
Committee did not have such a construction in mind. "Our proposal is that 
the reform should relate to those terms of a contract, which, on their true 
construction, were intended by the parties to the contract to benefit a 
third party 
.,34 
The intention to benefit must be expressed on the 
face of the contract. 
The only other possible construction of "implied term" is illustrated 
by the case of Robertson v. Wait
35 
where a charter party was made "on 
the usual terms". One of those terms was later proved to be that the 
consignee of the cargo (a third party) might be allowed to procure 
homeward freight, this resulting in a benefit to the third party. Here 
a third party is provided for by a term of a contract which, while not 
expressly for his benefit is of such a construction that that 
benefit is inherent in it. 
Support for this is derived by noting this remark of Finlay,
36 
while 
commenting on the recommendation of the UK Law Revision Committee. "The 
object of the first of these, limiting the right of action which it is 
proposed to give to third parties, to contracts which by their 
express terms purport to confer a benefit directly on a third party is 
presumably to exclude cases where the benefit is merely incidental. But 
it is rather doubtful whether these words would not also exclude cases 
like Robertson v. Wait" . 
Other situations in which such a construction would be warranted are 
situations where a benefit is provided for a class of persons. Thus 
in insurance contracts third parties are often protected as a class 
of persons. In this instance although the third party who is, in fact, 
injured may not have been expressly provided for on the fact of the 
contract, he was provided for by implication, as a member of that class. 
The prospect of allowing recovery on implied terms becomes a less daunting 
one if such a construction as above were to be placed on the words 
... 17 
17 
"confers, or purports to confer". In fact, such terms would be more 
accurately described as "ascertainable" rather than "implied". 
C. Subsection Two 
A final possibility is that subsection two, in providing that a promise 
may not, on the proper construction of the contract, be intended to 
create an enforceable obligation, necessarily indicates the need for an 
intention to benefit. 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, in their report 
37 II ' ' ' ' ' I state As Mr Acting Justice Myers pointed out in his paper Third 
38 
Party Contracts' there are many examples of contracts that in fact 
confer benefits on third parties, which it would be highly inconvenient 
to permit them to enforce .... It is, therefore, necessary to give 
close attention to the definition of the kind of benefit that the third 
parties should be permitted to enforce .... We prefer the view, 
consistent with the general principles of our law of contract, that the 
common intention of the contracting parties ascertained according to the 
ordinary rules of construction should have a decisive effect on 
determining whether or not the third parties should have enforcement 
rights." This appears similar to the form of section 4 in the draft 
Bill relating, apparently solely, to the control, already discussed, in 
subsection two. 
But immediately following this statement comes the conclusion "the 
reform should relate to those terms of a contract that, on their true 
construction, were intended by the parties to the contract to benefit a 
third party, unless it is evident that on the true construction of the 
contract it was not intended that the beneficiary should have rights of 
enforcement." 
It is submitted that the above two statements may in fact be i nte r p r e t e d 
as meaning the same thing. This would give subsection 2 two levels of 
construction, one serving to provide contracting parties with the ability 
to remove, from an intended beneficiary, the right to enforce the 
contract, the other providing a barrier to those third parties who are 
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not intended to have rights of enforcement because they were not 
intended to be benefitted. 
The second level of construction may be derived from the fact that "the 
proper construction of the deed or contract" must be taken into account 
to ascertain whether a promise is not intended to create an obligation 
enforceable at the suit of that person. The most obvious indication of 
this would be the fact that no reference is made, on the face of the 
contract, to a third party. A contract which is intended to benefit a 
third party will almost always refer to that party in the terms of the 
contract. 
It would appear logical therefore that where no reference is made to the 
third party, there can be no intention to benefit him and hence an 
intention to deny rights of enforcement. It is submitted that 
subsection 2 may impliedly suggest the need for an intention to benefit. 
However, such a construction is tenuous to say the least and perhaps the 
only conclusion that can be drawn from these considerations is that there 
is a need to establish more clearly in section 4 the further limitation 
proposed by the Committee in their report. 
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V. Difficulties With "Intention to Benefit" 
It is evident that a need for some form of limitation on the right of 
recovery of the third party is established. The Contracts and Commercial 
Law Reform Committee suggest that this limitation should be in the form of 
a requirement that before a third party can recover on a contract it must be 
shown that he was intended to be benefitted. It is submitted that the courts, 
in applying section 4, will either, by adopting the constructions considered 
in the preceeding section of this paper, or by implication, adopt as a stage 
in the recovery by a third party the test of "intention to benefit". 
However, the concept of an intention to benefit is itself not without 
difficulties. 
It is important to be careful that, if the term "intention to benefit" is 
adopted by the courts as a test, that it is not interpreted too strictly. The 
use of an "intention to benefit" is a misleading term bec ause all too often 
the actual intention of the parties are not reflected in the reasoning of the 
courts. The idea of an "intention" is an obscure concept. Parties to a 
contract have purposes and motives and rarely are these direc ted to the same 
end. 
Th i s f i ction i s e v e n more Pr onounced i n thi rd oar ty contracts whe r e what i s s ough t 
to be asce rtained i s that t he p arties to t he cont r act act i ve l y intended t he t h ird 
p arty t o be ben e f i t ted . In many insta nces oavment to a t h ird party may 
be merely an incidental part of the contract between two parties, for 
instance where there is a debt owed by A to C, A may contract with B that, 
in return for the performance of a service to B by A, B will pay the debt 
owed to C, a third party in this instanc e.
39 
The third party is not 
benefitted, he would have been able to maintain an action against the promisee 
A, in any case. Very rarely is there, in fact, any intention to benefit on 
the part of the contracting parties. In the case of creditors and debtors 
the opposite may in fact be the case. The contract itself is more often than 
not merely a matter of convenience. 
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Such situations have often been dealt with in the United States and for some 
years a distinction prevailed between what have come to be known as "donee 
beneficiaries" and "creditor beneficiaries". A third person is a donee 
beneficiary if the promisee who buys the promise expresses an intention and 
purpose to confer a benefit upon him as a gift in the shape of the promised 
performance . He is a creditor bene ficiary if the promisee or some other 
person is under an obligation, a duty or liability, to him and the contract 
is so made that the promised performance or the making of the executory 
contract itself will discharge that obligation.
40 
If the third party was a donee beneficiary h e was e ntitled to r ecove r on the 
contract. Howeve r, a creditor beneficiary was often r efus ed the right to 
recover on the basis that he was not inte nde d to benefit from the contract and 
should not have a right of recovery. The distinction has take n many years for 
the bulk of American states to abolish and would result in great :iardship if it 
were to be adopted in New Zealand. 
Howeve r, it is submitted that this distinction can be avoided easily unde r the 
Contracts (Privity) Bill because the require ment for an inte ntion to benefit 
in the section is only inferred and not espressly stipulated. For this r eason 
it is unlikely to be as strictly regulated as in the United States and where a 
provision is made, in the contract , that the benefit of the contract should 
redound to the creditor then that provision should be given e ffect to. 
A second difficulty arises from the fact that "intention to benefit " as a 
limitation may itself be insufficient. The Contracts and Commercial Law 
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Reform Committee r eport states " there are many e xamples of contracts that in 
fact confer benefits on third parties, which it would be highly inconvenient 
to permit them to e nforce . [For e xample ] Contracts between municipalitie s 
for the bulk supply of water or e l ectricity intended for r esa l e to consumers . 
In one sense, it may be said that such contracts confer benefits upon the 
consumers, but it would be a novel step to enable an individual cons ume r or 
group of them to take action to en force such a bulk supply contract . We do not 
advise such a step. " Howeve r, it is difficult to see how, unde r the 
Contracts (Privity) Bill as it now stands, these parties could be excluded . 
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Even if an intention to benefit were required it would appear that the very 
intention of a municipal contract is to benefit third parties , namely the 
consumer. Unless that contract expressly stipulated that the contract should 
not be en forceable by them, then it would appear that on a strict 
interpretation they should be given a remedy. 
In the United States, where a contract has been made with a municipality and 
performanc e will benefit large numbers of pe rsons it has been dealt with 
solely on the ground that their very number tends to infer that the contract 
42 was not made for their benefit. As Cardozo CJ in Ul tramares Corp . v. Touche 
stated "even in that field, however, the remedy is narrower where the 
benefi ciaries of the p romi se are indeterminate or general. Something more 
must then appear than an intention that the promise shall r e dound to the 
benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite extension . The 
promis e must be s uch as to "bespeak the assumption of a duty to make 
reparation directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is 
lost." 
It is submitted that the need for this sort of judicial manipulation should 
be avoided if possible . The difficulties expressed in this section of the 
paper could be remedied if, instead of subsection 2 stipulating that the 
section does not apply to a promise which is not intended to cre ate an 
obligation enforceable at the suit of the third party , it instead provided 
that the section only applies to a promise which , on the face of the 
contract , is intended to create an obligation enforceable at the suit of that 
person. Such a construction would have the effect of preventing merely 
incidental beneficiaries from suing on contracts , while not limiting unduly 
the rights of those third parti es with a valid claim for enforcement. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Should the Contracts (Privity) Bill become law New Zealand jurists will find 
themselves dealing with a hitherto unexplored field of law, that of the third 
party contract. Only in limited areas has the right of the third party to sue 
on a contract been considered. 
It is important, therefore, that the law governing this area should from the 
very start be precise and certain. To be avoided is the undue limitatiorsthat 
arise from a fear of extending the law too far into unknown realms, or the 
confusion that results from advancing too far only to find that a retreat into 
stricter law is required. 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee were obviously aware of these 
considerations when they recommended the detailed and extensive provisions now 
found in the Bill. However, as often occurs, the translation from 
recommendation to draft legislation is not always complete. Such would appear 
to be the case with the Contracts (Privity) Bill. 
Section 4 of the Bill provides the focus of the proposed legislation. Yet this 
paper indicates, it is hoped, that this section may be deficient. 
The section as it stands specifically restricts the right of the contracting 
parties , putting the onus on them to show that a contract was not intended to 
be enforceable by the third party . Yet there is only an implied restriction, 
if at all, on the rights of the third party to enforce the contract. 
It is submitted that there is a need for a restriction, and that that need 
was recognised by the Committee, but that the legislation as drafted does not 
sufficiently provide for it. 
The report of the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee suggests that 
the restriction should be in the form of a requirement of an "intention to 
benefit" on the part of the contracting parties , expressed on the face of 
the contract. However, it is submitted that the restriction provided by this 
requirement would be more effectively entrenched , not by requiring that an 
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"intention to benefit" be inserted in the section, but by a simpler and more 
precise control. 
It is submitted that in section 4, subsection l should remain the same but that 
subsection 2 should be altered to read: 
(2) This section shall only apply to a promise which, on the proper 
construction of the deed or contract , is intended to create an 
obligation enforceable at the suit of that person . 
* * * * * * * 
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